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Promoting Cognitive Conflict In Health Care Ethics: Moral 
Reasoning With Boundary Cases 
Dr. Julia Bursten, University of Kentucky, jrbursten@uky.edu 
Dr. Samantha Finkelstein, Carnegie Mellon University, slfink@cs.cmu.edu 
Abstract: As many college students are at a time of tremendous personal and academic 
growth, introductory philosophy courses have the potential to equip students with practical 
critical reasoning skills. Despite this,  many introductory courses in this domain emphasize 
students’ learning about pre-existing dialectics in the abstract, rather than over self-reflection 
and development of personal philosophical perspectives. In doing so, we may be failing to 
support the needs of pre-professional students looking to prepare themselves for their careers 
ahead. In this practitioner paper, we report our efforts as a practicing philosophy instructor 
(Bursten) and a learning scientist (Finkelstein) to iterate on the design of a student-centered 
instrument for moral reasoning in medical contexts within an introductory Health Care Ethics 
course.  We identified the positive role that providing boundary cases played in helping 
students’ experience productive cognitive conflict, and, in turn, how these experiences 
improved critical self-reflection and moral reasoning.  
Introduction 
Humanists in higher education are frequently asked to justify the value of their disciplines, even as politicians, 
journalists, and teachers wring their hands about the need for an educational system that more effectively 
imparts marketable skills in critical reasoning. The irony in this juxtaposition is the subject of rueful water-
cooler conversations in philosophy departments, where improved skill in critical thinking is presumed as a 
learning outcome in any introductory class. However, many philosophy classes teach that skill by rehearsing 
long-standing and insoluble debates among long-dead men, and students can—understandably—fail to export 
the lessons they learn in their later post-collegiate professional and personal lives. The dispassionate teaching of 
philosophy as a static dialectic, while useful for the evolution of academic debates in the field, fails to structure 
thinking practically or promote cognitive conflict effectively, and students are pedagogically underserved as a 
result.  
 This situation is troubling for the future of philosophy and for the future of education in critical 
reasoning. In applied ethics classes such as Health Care Ethics, failure to resolve the disconnect is even more 
perilous, as it could breed a generation of professionals unable to recognize or respond appropriately to 
instances of moral conflict. Here we examine an intervention in assignment design in a Health Care Ethics class 
at the University of Kentucky from 2016–2017. We designed an initial assignment aimed at helping students 
reflect on their own moral compass within medical contexts, and discovered that this initial instructional activity 
failed to meet our intended goals. We iterated on this assignment using principles from learning science such as 
information sequencing and boundary case examples the following semester, and identified salient differences in 
students’ outcomes. We attribute the differences observed to the increased cognitive conflict and personal stakes 
students experienced with the addition of boundary case examples. In writing this paper, we demonstrate an 
effective assignment for promoting moral reasoning skills at a time when such skills are salient for being both 
important for students’ development and difficult to teach. Further, we additionally aim for this paper to help 
contribute to addressing the long-recognized disconnect between learning science research and traditional 
classroom instructional design by modeling our process for iterating on the design of a learning activity based 
on pedagogical principles. 
Motivation and methods 
Health Care Ethics is the branch of philosophy concerned with making and justifying moral decisions in 
medicine. It includes debates about assisted suicide, abortion, the proper distribution of scarce and expensive 
treatments during an epidemic, and whether and when to start and stop extraordinary measures to save the life of 
a brain-damaged patient. The students who take this class are primarily interested in health care careers and 
share a deeply-felt anxiety about the prospect of making a life-or-death decision on behalf of their patients. 
What these students need out of this philosophy class is practice in conscious self-reflection, tailored to the 
domains of medicine and health care, in order to improve their capacity to make reflective, rational ethical 
decisions under professional pressure. 
To meet the instructional needs of these students, we developed a series of instructional activities, the Moral 
Compass assignments, around a self-reflective personal essay, an uncommon practice in philosophical 
pedagogy. In the initial formulation of the essay, which drew on principles of structured learning, students 
succeeded in consciously identifying their personal values but largely failed to employ the identified values to 
explain how they would reason in instances of moral conflict in health care settings. By redesigning the 
assignment around boundary cases, we were able to promote cognitive dissonance and observe improved use of 
identified personal values as a source of reasoning in instances of moral conflict. 
 Additionally, we found in this assignment design an interesting overlap between contemporary learning 
science theory and historical philosophical analyses of education and rationality. In the 1870s, the American 
Pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce wrote “The Fixation of Belief,” (1877) one of the great modern 
philosophical essays about how people come to question, form, and hold beliefs. In it, he defends an early 
formulation of the Pragmatist school’s definition of critical thinking, namely that rationality is a faculty, rather 
than an innate cognitive architecture or simply seeing the world in an objectively correct and dispassionate way. 
For the Pragmatists, rationality is a tool to be honed and developed with practice and through exposure to 
situations that challenge it with increasing difficulty. This analysis of rationality parallels and undergirds 
contemporary constructivist observations about the process of learning, which we observed in our collaboration 
during the assignment revision. 
The Moral Compass essay: initial formulation
The Moral Compass assignment carries through the semester as a piece of critical-thinking infrastructure. In the 
initial essay and subsequent individual and paired reflection activities, students practice recognizing and 
articulating their personal bases for self-reflective moral reasoning in health care settings by answering a series 
of short-essay questions designed to identify (1) their centrally held moral values, (2) the sources of those 
values, and (3) the consequences of those values for their beliefs about the ethical course of action in various 
health-care situations. Students then employ and develop their personal Moral Compasses throughout the rest of 
the class as they work through increasingly difficult historical and contemporary case studies in ethical conflict 
in health-care settings. 
 In its initial formulation, the third section of the Moral Compass essay asked students for an 
implication of their moral compass, that is, a general consequence of their moral beliefs for a problem domain in 
health care. Students chose a domain area from among assisted suicide, physician assistance in prisoner 
executions, abortion, doctors going against patients’ wishes, or disclosure of medical errors, and they 
determined how their Moral Compass would constrain or guide their beliefs about the limits of ethical action in 
their chosen domain. The goal of this section of the essay was to foster students through the state of doubt 
Peirce identified as an internal struggle to reconcile a challenged belief to newly presented information. Students 
had previously encountered boundary cases in these domains in readings and class discussions, and the 
assignment intended them to engage in a Peircean struggle in order to come to a belief about the morally 
permissible response to the ethical conflict presented in each domain. In practice, however, most students chose 
a domain where they could easily identify the morally permissible response according to their Moral Compass 
without engaging in a Peircean struggle. If their Compass identified all human life is sacrosanct, they wrote 
about the impermissibility of abortion; if their Compass emphasized the importance of individual liberty, they 
advocated the permissibility of assisted suicide. They avoided stirring internal conflict wherever possible, which 
both inhibited the goal of the assignment section and depressed the level of sophistication in the ensuing paired 
and class discussions. The implication piece of the assignment demanded revision in order to channel students 
into the more difficult task of applying their Moral Compass to a domain without an obvious, conflict-
minimizing response.  
Intervention: cognitive conflict for moral reasoning
Practical, evidence-based theories of learning are not traditionally applied to instructional design in higher 
education (Ambrose et al., 2010), and yet it is in these practice-based environments (in other words, real 
classrooms) where these theories have the most potential for positively impacting student outcomes. In revising 
this assignment, we maintained three joint goals that we felt were central to the students’ growth: they should 
have the knowledge that alternative moral perspectives offer different interpretations of complex situations 
without sacrificing goodness, the skills to reason about complex problems from competing angles, and the 
dispositions to choose to wrangle with complex phenomena that feel initially uncomfortable. We aimed for this 
assignment to help students grapple with learning to confront, examine, and evaluate the methods and 
considerations that impact their everyday moral decision-making. We applied three principles of evidence-based 
theories of learning to our instructional design to meet these goals.  
Increased relevance through tangible examples 
While philosophy instruction typically calls upon thought experiments or abstract scenarios, there is evidence 
that students may benefit from the increased emotional reality of real, tangible scenarios. Particularly in an 
applied health care ethics course where many students are pre-medical, this was a key opportunity to replace 
theoretical, abstract scenarios with real cases that contemporary physicians themselves had to grapple with. In 
doing so, we aimed to make it clearer for students to see that these questions may become a reality of their own 
throughout their career. We believed that in doing so, we might be able to increase students’ emotional 
engagement with the assignment. 
Cognitive conflict through boundary cases 
Theories of cognitive conflict argue that when an individual holds two or more elements of knowledge that are 
relevant to each other but inconsistent with one another, a state of discomfort, or dissonance, is created. 
Cognitive conflict is well-regarded as a proponent of self-reflection and cognitive change. Individuals in these 
states report increased negative affect, and this negative affect is reduced as cognitive discrepancy is reduced, 
such as through changing their mind (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Harmon-Jones, 2000). While traditionally applied 
to students’ understanding of scientific phenomena in a Piagetian sense, notions of cognitive conflict may also 
be relevant when it comes to subjective and personal matters such as morality. For example, self-consistency 
theory argues that cognitive dissonance occurs when a person acts in a way that violates their self-concept 
(Aronson, 1999); for this reason, we believed that in choosing the tangible examples described above, we would 
be able to capture complex scenarios that would make it more difficult for students to apply the conflict-
avoidant, categorical moral compasses they demonstrated in the earlier assignment (e.g., “physician-assisted 
suicide is always bad, because doctors should never be allowed to intentionally cause harm.”)  
Scaffolded reasoning through structure and sequencing 
The structure in which information is presented to students has the ability to influence the knowledge 
architectures they build through the process of working through an assignment. Instructors may be able to better 
support students’ development of complex reasoning by sequencing assignments intentionally and allowing 
more room for micro-reflection and peer or instructor feedback cycles. In the initial assignment, students had 
relatively few structured opportunities where they were required to explicitly grapple with uncomfortable 
perspectives; in the revised assignment, we aimed to build upon theories of information sequencing to build in 
such grappling into the instructional activities. For example, in contrast to the more independent nature of the 
first assignment, we built in an in-class activity that required students to identify the similarities and differences 
between their own interpretation to a boundary case with the interpretations provided by a partner.  
Revised assignment 
In the revised assignment, we developed the pair of boundary cases by adapting factual cases published in 
Steinbock et al. (2013). These cases occurred in recent medical history and were chosen in order to compel 
students to examine unexpected or unwelcome ethical ramifications of their newly-articulated moral compasses. 
In both cases, the students examine ethically complex patients from the perspective of the health care 
professionals treating the case.  
 The first case (“Mrs. Boomsma”) presents a woman, whose primary social and emotional identity is as 
a mother, seeking assisted suicide after both her sons die tragically within a few years of one another. She has no 
family and no mental illness, aside from a grief-induced clinical depression. The case considers the perspective 
of her psychiatrist, who consults with a variety of colleagues before determining that the ethical course of action 
is to provide the woman with medication that allows her to take her own life. 
 The second case (“Melissa”) presents a drug-addicted woman with a history of mental illness who is 
pregnant with twins. When she notices an unfamiliar sensation in her pregnancy, she visits an emergency room, 
where physicians diagnose her with low amniotic fluid and recommend that she undergo an immediate pre-term 
Caesarean section. She declines the recommendation and delivers later in the pregnancy, which results in one of 
her children being stillborn. She is later charged with child endangerment for this decision, and her doctors 
testify against her. 
 In each of these cases, students consider whether they would have acted similarly to the physicians or 
differently (Would they have given the lethal medication? Would they have let the woman disobey doctors’ 
orders or physically forced her to remain in the hospital and deliver?), and to explicate their reasoning for their 
chosen course of action in by referencing their personal Moral Compass.  
Observations and discussion 
Using constructivist principles, we adapted the revised assignment from the initial assignment in three ways: by 
developing additional structure by asking students to respond to more detailed cases with stricter interpretive 
parameters, by improving partner reflection activities to allow students to focus on how their Moral Compasses 
differed from those of their peers, and, most importantly, by narrowing the domain in which students tested their 
Moral Compass from a general area of ethical concern into a targeted boundary case. 
 We have applied the revised assignment in two semesters at the time of this writing. In both courses, 
there seemed to be a marked difference in students’ demonstrated productive reasoning behaviors compared to 
those demonstrated by students who completed the initial assignment in the years prior. Broadly, through the 
revised assignment, students broadly seemed to make more references to their own uncertainty, and 
demonstrated increased engagement with value-challenging scenarios. There also seemed to be a notable 
reduction in catch-all, categorical rules being applied to complex situations and dismissiveness towards their 
peers’ competing frameworks.  
 In the initial assignments, students’ responses were often categorical. One such representative response 
“according to my moral compass, I do not think it is ever morally permissible for a woman to have an 
abortion.” Conversely, in the revised assignment, students demonstrated several complex structures not widely 
seen in the initial assignment, including reasoning from others’ perspectives (“Mrs. Boomsma’s core values 
were to care for her children and she practiced those values for more than 20 years”) and supporting their 
arguments with more specific examples (“When Doctor Chabot decided to use the lethal injection on his patient, 
he violated the religious, the life value and the optimism compasses. Mrs. Boomsma’s reasons for suicide are 
questionable reasons and hence not justified.”) 
 One particularly interesting feature of the revision, which may be an artifact of the regional 
environment in which the class takes place, is that students frequently appealed explicitly to their religious 
backgrounds in developing their Moral Compasses, and during these appeals confronted the fact that there are a 
variety of ethical frameworks available within a particular religious tradition. While the student population each 
semester included students of Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or non-religious backgrounds, a majority of students each 
semester identified as Christian, and most of these students initially appealed to their Christianity as an 
unequivocal guide to action. With the development of their Moral Compasses, however, and especially in a 
paired reflection activity during the revised assignment, students confronted the notion that their peers could 
identify as Christian and yet arrive at ethical conclusions distinct from their own. For instance, some students in 
this population thought it was morally obligatory for the psychiatrist to help the woman in the first care take her 
life and some thought it was morally impermissible, and each side was surprised at each other’s assessments. 
The realization among this student population of a shared religious background that nonetheless led to differing 
ethical recommendations was referenced in ensuing classroom and homework discussions, and it advanced and 
increased the sophistication of these discussions.  
 Additionally, we observed that in a paired reflection activity where students were asked to identify 
similarities and differences between the implication/application of their Moral Compass and that of their partner, 
the initial assignment never produced any observed changes or dissonances in the partner pairs. In the revised 
assignment, however, some students reported that their discussion with their partner changed their minds about 
the ethical course of action in the situation, either through a re-examination of their Moral Compass itself or 
through additional discussion of what actions are suggested or mandated by their Compass.  
Conclusion and broader implications 
Learning is a constructive and continuous process. Peirce and his contemporaries have argued, and modern-day 
learning science provides evidence that, this process occurs by the iterative testing of beliefs against causes for 
doubt, which he describes as “an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass 
into the state of belief.” (Peirce, 1877, p. 10) It is in this active struggle between belief and doubt that 
knowledge is reorganized, mindsets are updated, and learning occurs. This framework of doubting as an internal 
struggle that is resolved by forming a belief is a useful philosophical analysis of the learning processes observed 
in the promotion and resolution of cognitive conflict.  
 A continued practice of self-reflection is widely regarded as a central foundation of this process. 
Unfortunately, in many courses purporting to teach critical thinking, self-reflection rarely makes an appearance. 
Instead, students are assessed only by their abilities to apply someone else’s theories to someone else’s cases. 
The traditional philosophical dialectic encourages secondary and even tertiary commentary as the standard 
assignment output. While this sort of pedagogical approach advances academic philosophy, it does not leave 
room for the self-reflection that Peirce and the American Pragmatists identified as critical to belief formation, 
and which is presently recognized as the learning that occurs when cognitive conflict occurs. 
 At the same time, when self-reflection does make an appearance in higher education courses, it may 
rarely reach the productive level of critical self-reflection (Atkinson, 2005). While critical self-reflection is 
intended to help students grapple with the struggle described by Peirce above, too frequently self-reflection has 
become equated with journaling, where students outline their thoughts as they have them (Eyler, 2000). 
 The progression of the Moral Compass assignment documented here captures our efforts at meeting 
both of the above sets of practical, pedagogical needs. In the initial assignment, we aimed to introduce self-
reflection in ways that would be productive for students’ personal post-collegiate application; in the revised 
assignment, we iterated the learning activities to better support the development of critical self-reflection, 
wherein they were provided with a structured environment that pushed them to re-examine and better 
understand their own values, perspectives, and behaviors more deeply. Through documenting this iteration here, 
we aim to provide an argument for coursework that pushes students to engage critically with the domain, as well 
as a model of our own process that may serve to support future educators’ efforts to do the same.  
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